Observing HTI’s Da’wah Movement Following Perppu Number 2 of 2017 Concerning Community Organizations by Fatmawati, Fatmawati et al.

Editor-In-Chief
Muhammad Alfatih Suryadilaga, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Managing Editor
Saifuddin Zuhri, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesia
Abdul Mustaqim, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesia
Editors
Muhammad Amin Abdullah, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesia
Sahiron Syamsuddin, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesia
Jajang A Rahmana, Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University of Bandung Indonesia, Indonesia
Iqbal Ahnaf, CRCS Gajahmada  University, Indonesia
Samsul Ma’arif, CRCS Gajahmada University, Indonesia
Aksin Wijaya, IAIN Ponorogo, Indonesia
Umma Faridah, IAIN Kudus, Indonesia
International Editors Board
Mun'im Sirry, Notre Dame University
Ronald Lukens-Bull, Professor of Anthropology and Religious Studies Department of Sociology, 
Anthropology, and Social Work University of North Florida, United States
The : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin is an independent academic journal focusing on the sciences 
of the ushululddin (principles of religion), published twice a year (April and October) by the Faculty of 
Ushuluddin and Islamic Thought, State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.  It is a shared 
space to disseminate and publish the scholarly papers of those whose concern is the sciences of ushuluddin, 
such as, Kalam, Tasawuf, Islamic Philosophy, Tafsir, Hadith, Comparative Religion, Studies of Religion and 
Islamic Thoughts.
The : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin  was launched in February, 2000 by the Faculty of Ushuluddin 
and Islamic Thought, State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. This journal was once accredited 
by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Indonesia based on the Decree of the Directorate General of 
Higher Education, No. 52/DIKTI/Kep/2002.
Currently, The : Jurnal llmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin has been accredited based on the Decree of the 
Director General of Research and Development Research and Development of the Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 36a/E/KPT/2016.
In order to improve the quality of the journal and incoming articles, since 2017, the Esensia: Jurnal llmu-
Ilmu Ushuluddin was heading to be an International Journal. Manuscripts submitted can be written either 
in English or Arabic. Please submit your manuscript via http://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia
Vol 20, No. 1, April 2019
DAFTAR ISI
Understanding the Contestation of Multi Political Parties in Indonesia Through Nietzsche’s 
Conflictive-Agonistic Power and Elias’s Figurative Power Conception
Alim Roswantoro ..................................................................................................................... 1
Analyzing the Concept of Tawakal in Al-Palimbani’s Paradigm of Tasawuf
Pirhat Abbas ............................................................................................................................ 17
Coherence Method in Matan Criticism 
Ahmad Musyafiq  .................................................................................................................... 37
Aids as God’s Punishment: 
Examining Ibn Majah’s Sexual Ethics and Implication of Transgression
Maufur & Saifuddin Zuhri ........................................................................................................ 51
Extraordinary Women (Harmony of Ibadah and Aqidah in Inventing the Perfection
of Ramadan at the Salat Empat Puluh in Sijunjung)
Salma Salma, Jarudin Jarudin .................................................................................................. 61
Building an Islamic Feminist Liberation Theology  For Women in Prostitution
Investigating Women’s Liberation of Prostitution at Pasar Kembang, Yogyakarta
Rahmadi Agus Setiawan .......................................................................................................... 73
Religious Tolerance in the Quran and Sunnah 
and the Importance of Its Application in Indonesia
ايسينودنا يف هقيبطت ةيمهأو ةنسلاو نآرقلا ءوض يف ينيدلا حماستلا
Umma Farida ........................................................................................................................... 95
Observing HTI’s Da’wah Movement Following Perppu Number 2 of 2017 Concerning 
Community Organizations
Fatmawati, Kalsum Minangsih, Siti Mahmudah Noorhayati .................................................. 119
, Vol 20, No. 1, April 2019
ISSN: 1411-3775     E-ISSN: 2548-4729
http://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia
119
Observing HTI’s Da’wah Movement Following Perppu 
Number 2 of 2017 Concerning Community Organizations
Fatmawati1, Kalsum Minangsih2, Siti Mahmudah Noorhayati3
1, 2UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 3Institut Agama Islam Sahid Bogor
E-mail: 1fatmawati@uinjkt.ac.id, 2kalsumminangsih@uinjkt.ac.id, 3noorhayatimahmudah@gmail.com 
Abstract
This research was based on an academic concern regarding the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
on July 19, 2017 through Perppu (Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) Number 2 of 
2017 concerning Community Organizations. This Perppu has changed the map of the HTI’s da’wah and 
political movements which were previously massive and dominant in various media and became silent at 
once. Previously known as the 411, the 212, and the 505 Muslim Movements which were led HTI people, 
then after the HTI dissolution, this organization seemed to be in suspended animation and vanished without a 
trace. Even HTI’s preaching movements on various online media under the organization’s guidance have been 
difficult to find. Based on this concern, the formulation of the problem in this study is as follows: first, what is 
the doctrine and anatomy of the HTI movement? Second, how was the HTI da’wah movement since the New 
Order until the issuance of Perrpu Number 2 of 2017? Third, what strategies are used by Hizbut Tahrir after 
the enactment of Perppu Number 2 of 2017? Fourth, what Counter Narrative reveals the HTI’s inconsistencies 
after the enactment of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations? These questions 
will be answered qualitatively through descriptive explanation of the object being studied as behavior and 
an event with the main location in Indonesia with its information from actors and documents scattered in 
the electronic and print media, so that the data source is mostly literature and does not rule out the possible 
date from informants. In conclusion, the HTI movement as a da’wah and political organization will continue 
to exist despite being banned institutionally. Based on observation and discussion with several community 
leaders, HTI is continues recruiting new members, especially on public campuses which have become its hub, 
even though it is done with silent operations. In addition, national political contestation ahead of the 2019 
presidential election is also very vulnerable to being ridden by HTI, either by continuing to spread propaganda 
or raise the issues of government failure in alleviating poverty, securing domestic assets, and the rule of law.
Keywords: HTI, Da’wah Movement, State Hegemony.
Abstrak
Penelitian ini didasarkan pada pertimbangan akademis mengenai pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) pada 19 Juli 2017 melalui Perppu (Pengesahan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti 
Undang-Undang) Nomor 2 tahun 2017 tentang Organisasi Masyarakat. Perppu ini telah mengubah 
peta dakwah dan gerakan politik HTI yang sebelumnya masif dan dominan di berbagai media, 
menjadi gerakan yang hening seketika. Setelah sebelumnya dikenal melalui Gerakan Muslim 411, 
212, dan 505 yang dipimpin orang-orang HTI, kemudian setelah pembubaran HTI, organisasi ini 
tampaknya mati suri dan menghilang tanpa jejak. Gerakan dakwah HTI di berbagai media online di 
bawah naungan organisasi tersebut juga sulit untuk ditemukan. Berdasarkan persoalan ini, rumusan 
masalah dalam penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut; pertama, apa doktrin dan anatomi gerakan 
HTI? Kedua, bagaimana gerakan dakwah HTI sejak Orde Baru hingga terbitnya Perrpu Nomor 2 
tahun 2017? Ketiga, strategi apa yang digunakan oleh Hizbut Tahrir setelah berlakunya Perppu 
Nomor 2 tahun 2017? Keempat, Kontra Narasi apa yang mengungkapkan inkonsistensi HTI setelah 
berlakunya Perppu Nomor 2 tahun 2017 tentang Organisasi Masyarakat? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan 
ini akan dijawab secara kualitatif melalui penjelasan deskriptif tentang objek yang dikaji sebagai 
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A. Background
When doing a simple search of Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (hereafter referred to as HTI) 
in online media, the wikipedia page will appear 
at the top of the line to provide full description 
of this organization. Next comes a line of 
sub discussion explaining HTI’s dissolution 
in Indonesia. The reviews are presented 
normatively using several quotes as follows:
“The Indonesian government officially 
dissolved Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia on July 
19, 2017 based on the Decree of the Minister 
of Law and Human Rights Number AHU-
30.AH.01.08 in 2017 which is based on 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
(Perppu) Number 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations. The HTI’s 
dissolution was based on the ideology they 
spread, the establishment of a sharia state, 
regarded as being against the mandate of the 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Radical 
organizations, like HTI, are considered to 
threaten the existence of democracy that 
has been enjoyed by Indonesia since the 
collapse of the New Order. For this reason, 
the government dissolved HTI.”1
The dissolution of HTI was immediately 
recorded in Wikipedia as the initial information 
about the existence of HTI which has been 
dissolved by the government through 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 
2 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations 
1 https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizbut_Tahrir 
accessed on 8 Oktober 2017.
which was ratified on July 19, 2017. Even 
print and electronic media quickly reported it 
massively. Not only was HTI dissolved through 
the Perppu, it turned out that the government 
has also blocked its official website that it can no 
longer be accessed by the public. In its reporting, 
an online media carried the head line as follows:
“The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) site 
has been blocked by the government 
through the Ministry of Communication 
and Information (Kominfo). The blocking 
of the site was carried out on Saturday July 
22 2017.”2
Ironically, the HTI movement seemed 
shocked and did not expect that the government 
through its power hegemony took a firm 
stand and dissolved the organization that 
had existed for twenty-five years. Uniquely, 
the government’s attitude was based on input 
from various community groups, both civilian 
and military, one of which was through the 
Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI).3
Along with the dissolution of HTI 
through Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations, the HTI movement 
which was previously very massive and 
dominated various media through da’wah 
2 https://news.okezone.com/read/2017/07/24/337/ 
1742611/pemerintah-blokir-situs-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia 
accessed on 8 October 2017.
3 https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/mui-dukung-
pembubaran-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia/3951718.html. 
Accessedd on 8 October 2017.
perilaku dan peristiwa dengan lokasi utama di Indonesia dengan informasi dari aktor dan dokumen 
yang tersebar di media elektronik dan cetak, sehingga sumber data sebagian besar literatur dan 
tidak keluar dari penanggalan waktu dari informan. Sebagai kesimpulan, gerakan HTI sebagai 
dakwah dan organisasi politik akan terus ada meskipun dilarang secara kelembagaan. Berdasarkan 
pengamatan dan diskusi dengan beberapa tokoh masyarakat, HTI terus merekrut anggota baru, 
terutama di kampus-kampus umum yang telah menjadi pusatnya, meskipun itu dilakukan dengan 
operasi hening. Selain itu, kontestasi politik nasional menjelang pemilihan presiden 2019 juga 
sangat rentan ditunggangi oleh HTI, baik dengan terus menyebarkan propaganda atau mengangkat 
masalah kegagalan pemerintah dalam mengentaskan kemiskinan, mengamankan aset domestik, 
dan supremasi hukum.
Kata kunci: HTI, Gerakan Dakwah, Hegemoni Negara.
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movements and its politics became silent at 
once. So, after the dissolution, HTI seemed 
to go through apparent death and vanished 
without a trace. Even the da’wah movement 
in various online media under the guidance of 
HTI is difficult to find. The question is, where 
is the direction of the HTI movement after 
July 19, 2017, when Perppu Number 2 of 2017 
concerning Community Organizations was 
enacted?
At least, the HTI movement since that day, 
has been a veiled movement for their helplessness 
on the one hand against government hegemony 
and the interests of political da’wah on the other. 
In this case, they realized that the situation and 
the da’wah field were in an emergency under 
government hegemony. The phenomena of 
the propaganda movement and the political 
movement of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia toward 
state hegemony which was carried out quietly 
after Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations then enacted as a 
government regulation are interesting to study. 
Therefore, this study found its relevance. 
Based on the background above, the 
formulation of the problems in this study is as 
follows: First, what is the doctrine and anatomy 
of the movement built by HTI? Second, how 
was the HTI’s da’wah movement since the New 
Order until the enactment of Perppu Number 2 
of 2017 concerning Community Organizations? 
Third, what da’wah strategies are used by HTI 
after the enactment of Perppu Number 2 of 
2017 concerning Community Organizations? 
Fourth, what is the counter narrative to uncover 
the inconsistencies of HTI after the enactment 
of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations?
B. Discussion
1. Doctrine and Anatomy of the HTI 
Movement in Fighting against 
Oppositionalism 
As a da’wah and political movement, the 
anatomy of the Hizbut Tahrir movement is 
very similar to that of the sects in the early days 
of Islam, namely the Khawarij, mostly from 
Bedouin tribes in the interior of the Arabian 
Peninsula. This can be seen in three main 
reasons. First, the similarity between them is a 
resistance movement against oppositionalism. 
While classical Khawarij was born as a form 
of resistance to the oppositionalism of two 
hostile Muslim poles during the leadership 
‘Ali ibn Abi Talib as the fourth caliph4, HT 
is slightly different in which it resists due 
to external factors of Muslims, namely the 
Western hegemony on cultural, political, social 
and economic aspects. Second, the equality 
in rejecting the interpretation of the corpus 
syariah text (anti-hermeneutics), including 
efforts to understand the text according to the 
context, aim and purpose (maqashid as-shari’ah). 
Third, there is fanaticism and is not blind to the 
teachings in the sect. Hizbut Tahrir believes in 
the truth as the only thing that surrounds its 
group without opening up to sects, groups or 
religious understanding outside its group and 
is reluctant to engage in an open and critical 
dialog.5
Based on this perspective, it is clear that the 
anatomy of the HT movement can be viewed in 
two perspectives, which on the one hand can be 
categorized as a political movement (al-harakah 
al-siyasiyyah) and a religious sect movement (al-
harakah al-diniyyah). The interpretation of this 
perspective refers to the statement put forward 
by Muhammad Abu Zahrah, who sees Islamic 
4 Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-Madzahib al-
Islamiyyah (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Araby, t.th), 56-57.
5 Syamsul Rijal, “Radikalisme Islam Klasik dan 
Kontemporer: Membanding Khawarij dan Hizbut Tahrir”, 
Jurnal al-Fikr, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2010), 225-226.
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sects in the past as not being religious sects, but 
some of them were purely political movements 
such as the Khawarij case.6
2. HTI Da’wah Movement from the New 
Order to the Enactment of Perppu 
Number 2 of 2017 concerning Community 
Organizations
Based on four stages of the traveling theory 
proposed by Edward Said, the development of 
HTI in Indonesia is quite successful and very 
fast because there are similarities in identity, 
culture, and background with HT’s in other 
countries.7 HT ideology first has gone through a 
configuration from its place of origin, traveling 
to various countries, experiencing interaction 
and dialectic stages with culture and locus of 
local communities to then sublimate, adjust or 
reconfigure itself in the final objective. During 
the span of the decade from 1980 to 1990, 
the HTI’s ideology found momentum to be 
marketed easily because at that time Indonesia 
was being hit by a multidimensional crisis. But 
due to the strong influence of the New Order, 
HTI recruited members and their da’wah 
activities through underground movements. All 
da’wah and political activities were then carried 
out in secret. The term taqiyah also appears as 
an embodiment of the way and behavior of HTI 
members when hiding their identities. At this 
time, HTI members could not know directly 
6 When describing the similarities and differences 
of each existing Islamic sects, Abu Zahrah argued that 
not all of these sects were religious, each of which had 
a fundamental difference in the subject of religion 
(ushuluddin). In the Khawarij sect, for example, there 
are some groups which, in fact, are Sunnis, but in a 
political perspective, some of these groups or individuals 
belong to the Khawarij fis-siyasah group, as in the case of 
the Mu’awiyyah and Sayyidina ‘Aisyah ra. Both can be 
categorized as the Khawarij group because both of them 
resisted the leadership of ‘Ali as the legitimate fourth 
Caliph. Explanation of each political and religious sect in 
Islam, see: Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-Madzahib, 
70.
7 Masdar Hilmy, “Akar-akar Transnasionalisme 
Islam Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia”, Jurnal Islamica, Vol. 6, 
No.1 (2011): 4-7.
who the leader of the organization was.
In order to carry out its mission to establish 
a caliphate in Indonesia, there are three stages 
in HTI’s da’wah strategies. First, the tathqif stage 
(coaching and caderization), i.e. by inviting 
people to come to the house as a model of da’wah 
taught by the Prophet. This stage focuses on 
recruiting members and building the militancy 
of cadres. This stage is carried out by holding 
halaqah which is guided by several senior 
members. In the context of higher education, 
usually cadres who have already been in HTI 
will target new students and then invite them to 
have discussion. Students who are interested in 
such discussion are then intensely involved in 
various halaqah activities to be given a dogmatic 
understanding of caliphate as an obligation 
that must be enforced in order to realize amar 
makruf nahy munkar (promotion of virtues 
and prevention of vice) in the community. 
Second, the al-tafa’ul (interaction) stage, i.e. the 
interaction that HTI militants build with the 
community. At this stage, HTI focuses on efforts 
to provide awareness to the community that 
something is wrong with the system adopted 
by the government. They begin to introduce the 
concept of caliphate widely by building public 
opinion about the necessity of upholding the 
law of Allah Almighty, rejecting the thaghut 
system and spreading various propaganda that 
Muslims were in oppression. The third stage 
is the taslim stage (accepting power as a whole 
through the support of the ummah). At this stage, 
HTI will declare itself as a party (hizb) and will 
further do various things to stage a coup. This 
last stage is actually the main objective of HTI in 
order to seize power.8 
In the context of politics in Indonesia, 
from the beginning HTI tried to be consistent 
with its neutrality in politics. HTI’s rejection of 
democracy was embodied in its organizational 
8 Sudarno Shobron, “Model Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia”, Profetika: Jurnal Studi Islam, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(2014): 52-54.
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policies that prohibit its activists from being 
involved in party politics as an active member 
of the executive board and a campaigner, both 
Islamic and secular parties, even though this 
organization did not stop activists from playing 
active roles in democratic parties, namely 
voting in elections. At the organizational level 
- and not at the individual, HTI tries to keep 
its distance from political parties because it 
considers Indonesia’s political fundamentals to 
be un-Islamic, dilapidated and in the process of 
moral decay.
This involvement in political parties means 
that HTI justifies the “un-Islamic” practices 
in Indonesian politics which is therefore 
sinful, except the political reality that is truly 
“Islamized”. HTI maintains its image as an extra-
parliamentary organization that provides moral 
advice to the public in general. As a result, this 
organization does not have any formal affiliation 
with certain Islamic political parties, nor does it 
encourage its members to channel their votes to 
certain political parties. Throughout 2004, for 
example, HTI did not encourage its activists to 
elect a certain presidential candidate.
According to Maghfur Wahid, a member 
of HTI national executive board, the activists 
of this organization were given the freedom 
to elect whoever they wanted. HTI itself did 
not issue an official announcement regarding 
the 2004 presidential election. However, the 
HTI Lampung Branch advised its members 
and supporters to abstain since none of the 
candidates who ran in the election met the 
requirements set by HTI.9 
To a certain degree, HTI practices an 
ambiguous policy that leads to a double 
standard approach to politics. An interpretation 
of this trend is the adoption of “camouflage 
politics” (taqiyyu) by a number of HTI activists 
and they will make their choices when deemed 
appropriate.
9 “Aktivis Hizbut Tahrir Pilih Golput,” Gatra 26 
April 2004. 
Along with the reform that allows for the 
freedom of expression, HTI began to take 
its momentum. The da’wah movement is 
carried out openly. Print and electronic media 
as an extension of its da’wah and political 
movements are often found. HTI also has an 
official website at www.hizbuttahrir.go.id as 
the official information dissemination media of 
the organization. Its flag bearing lafdzul-jalalah 
is clearly displayed on the front page of the 
website.
Eventually the HTI movement rapidly 
increased by the end of 2016. This is evidenced 
by the political mass mobilization of Hizbut 
Tahrir called the 411 Muslim movement, the 
212 Muslim movement, and the 505 Muslim 
movement. The momentum of this mass-
mobilization made HTI the forefront of driving 
forces with its political goals in the 2017 Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Election. Mobilization and call 
for radical propaganda through the events of 
the Muslim movements were also inseparable 
from the role of online media, both news media 
and social media such as twitter. Facebook, 
YouTube, blogs and WhatsApp applications on 
a large scale as a radical propaganda to attract 
sympathy from Muslims. In this case, Tri Pujiati 
considered social media propaganda a profitable 
means of radical da’wah. Open propaganda was 
designed to recruit as many new members as 
possible face to face. As a result, a large number 
of new recruits were teens who happened to be 
active users of social media. Those whose age is 
between 15 and 25 are prone to get influenced 
in the way they think, and swayed to show self-
existence.10
HTI’s success in the Muslim movements and 
the succession of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial 
10 Tri Pujiati, “Dakwah Radikal dan Propaganda 
Media Sosial,” in http://jalandamai.org/dakwah-radikal-
dan-propaganda-media-sosial.html. See also Fatmawati 
et al., “Jihad penista agama jihad NKRI; Analisa Teori 
Hegemoni Antonio Gramsci terhadap Fenomena Dakwah 
Radikal di Media Online,” Research Report (UIN Syarif 
Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2017). 2.
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Election had tremendously increased the 
popularity of this community organization until 
the emergence of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 
concerning Amendments to Law Number 17 
of 2013 concerning Community Organizations 
which culminated on the dissolution of HTI. 
Despite the rejection and resistance from two 
members of the HTI executive board, Wiranto as 
a representative of the government stressed that 
the dissolution of HTI referred to three reasons. 
First, as a legal community organization, 
HTI does not carry out a positive role to take 
part in the development process in order to 
achieve national goals. Second, the activities 
carried out by HTI strongly have contradicted 
the objectives, principles and characteristics 
based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia as stipulated 
in Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Mass 
Organizations. Third, the activities carried out 
by HTI are considered to have caused clashes in 
the community which could possibly threaten 
public security and order, and endanger the 
integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia (NKRI).11
The HTI movement during the the New 
Order era, the Reform and after the enactment 
of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 had a major 
impact on the sustainability of this community 
organization. This is evidenced by the presence 
of Yusril Ihza Mahenda as a lawyer who filed 
a lawsuit to the State Administrative Court 
(PTUN) to sue the State for the enactment 
of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning the 
Dissolution of HTI.
However, HTI’s other da’wah movements 
continued to take place to maintain its existence. 
Some actions ranging from mass mobilization 
to the electronic and print media movements, 
hearings and live broadcasts on television were 
carried out. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia considered 
that this Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
11 Ambaranie Nadia Kemala Movanita, “HTI Resmi 
Dibubarkan Pemerintah”, at https://nasional.kompas.com.
(Perppu) was issued as a shortcut to dissolve 
HTI. Previously, the government had openly 
stated its intention to dissolve HTI because 
this organization’s principles are contrary to 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In fact, this 
Perppu indicated the government’s intention to 
dissolve certain mass organizations, not to deal 
with emergencies.12
3. HTI’s Strategies in Da’wah Movement 
following the Enactment of Perppu 
Number 2 of 2017 concerning Community 
Organizations 
After Perppu No. 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations was passed into 
Law Number 16 of 2017 on November 22, 2017, 
HTI regreted the government’s attitude which 
is considered arrogant. HTI argued that so far 
it has carried out and organized da’wah in an 
orderly, polite and peaceful manner. There has 
never been a record of anarchism at all. So, 
HTI tried to find where the fault is. The first 
and foremost of HTI’s internal response to the 
Perppu was to ensure that no HTI members 
would be arrested. Should that happen, it is, in 
fact, a violation of civil rights and freedom of 
assembly.
Solahuddin, a researcher at the University 
of Indonesia raised questions and made 
statements related to the Perppu on Community 
Organizations. After the Perppu is enacted, will 
HTI with its caliphate concept really disappear 
on Indonesian soil? The answer is that to date, 
HTI still enjoys the freedom to change it with 
the Caliphate ideology.
Following the issuance of the Perppu, the 
dissolution of HTI has greatly influenced the 
Organization’s freedom of da’wah movement. 
Yet, this situation can be well handled as HTI 
has the experience as an underground (hidden) 
movement. HTI has the ability to adapt to any 
12 Ayomi Amindoni, “Perlawanan Politik Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia untuk Batalkan Perrpu Ormas,” at https://
www.bbc.com
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situation, whatever the current situation. The 
government’s decision to dissolve (repress) it, 
does not necessarily eliminate its movements 
and threats to the country’s ideology.
As an organization capable of surviving 
in various political situations, HTI changes its 
movement map into several strategies. While 
previously HTI had the Al-Islam bulletin which 
was usually distibuted to mosques during 
Friday prayers, now they have replaced it 
with the Kaffah da’wah bulletin. It is seaily 
predictable because the identity politics as they 
have been running so far has been consistently 
used, including naming to the bulletin. In its 
Edition 001 16 Dhul Qa’dah 1438 H / 11 August 
2017, it is mentioned,
“...it is therefore forbidden for Muslims to 
deny or get rid of part of Islamic sharia from 
the reality of life by following the principle 
of secularism (separating religion from life) 
as currently practiced by the state.”
Changes in identity have also occurred in 
some of its organizational wings that recruit 
secondary school students. Some sources said 
that the HTI movement is increasingly massive 
to attract school-age children by establishing 
a very identical organization named Karim 
(Community of Royatul Islam) because at this 
school age the students do not know much 
about cadre-based Islamic organizations such 
as IPNU and IPPNU, as in the case of PMII and 
HMI in universities which were later considered 
effective enough to counter HTI movements in 
several Islamic and public campuses.
In the political context, there has been a 
change in the fundamental thought pattern 
of the HTI group, where most of them had 
been encouraged to participate politically by 
directing support to one of the presidential 
and vice-presidential pairs. Some HTI figures 
were also seen campaigning to ensure victory 
of certain candidates, such as Ismail Yusanto’s 
support as HTI’s spokesman for movement 
#2019changethepresident13 which then 
allegedly contained a rebellion movement even 
though Ismail stated openly that it was meant 
to replace the incumbent with a new president 
(Prabowo) and the presence of Al-Khaththath 
in the implementation of the great campaign 
Prabowo-Sandi at Gelora Istora Senayan on 
Sunday 7 April 2019.14 
Political parties that supported the 
Community Organizations Perppu were marked 
by HTI so as not to give them a vote. The factions 
supporting the Perppu included PPP, PKB, 
Democrats, etc. There were assumptions that 
the dissolution of this mass organization would 
only increase influence of the HTI movement 
in resisting the government so that HTI would 
not give up its actions that had been developed 
so far. For example, “the assumptions that they 
built as a marginalized community, tyrannized 
by the ruling government, denied of its right, 
have become a powerful weapon to attract 
sympathy from many people”. At least, da’wah 
activities remain a strategy that continues to take 
place, because for them as a group that preaches 
Islam, da’wah does not require permission from 
the government. Islam is preaching, for anyone 
who has declared a shahada. The dissolution of 
HTI certainly will not affect its spirit of da’wah.
HTI’s political awareness is interesting 
because this Organization has indirectly 
violated its own doctrine, namely forbidding 
democracy and things related to it, including 
general elections. A series of epistemologies of 
Islamic law need to be explored to understand 
HTI’s inconsistencies, namely the urgent 
situation that requires someone to take 
something that was previously forbidden.15 
13 https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1121414/hti-
mengaku-dukung-gerakan-2019gantipresiden.
14 https://www.merdeka.com/politik/di-kampanye-
prabowo-al-khaththath-serukan-putihkan-tps-dan-baca-
fatwa-mui-di-masjid.html.
15 Rules of declaring, تاروظحلما حيبت تارورضلا. Tajuddin 
as-Subki, al-Asybah wan-Nazhair (Beirut: Darul Kutub 
‘Ilmiyyah, 1991), 55.
Observing HTI’s Da’wah Movement Following 
Perppu Number 2 of 2017 Concerning Community Organizations
126 |  , Vol 20, No. 1, April 2019
There are allegations where to get the legality 
back after the Government banned it through 
the Community Organzations Perppu, they had 
no choice but to support one of the presidential 
candidate pairs and to participate in using their 
voting rights in the presidential and legislative 
elections this time.
4. Counter Narration in Revealing the Incon-
sistency of HTI following the Enactment 
of Community Organizations Perppu
There is a quite interesting counter 
narrative that can be explored from the enected 
Community Organizations Perppu considering 
substantively that inconsistencies have occurred 
within the body of HTI’s ideology itself. The 
narrative constructed by the government by 
dissolving HTI through the Perppu is not 
without consideration. The government has 
heard advice and absorbed the aspirations of 
various parties in the society and those who 
are known for their reputation in maintaining 
tolerance, nationality and diversity. Several 
mass organizations have carried out various 
acts of radicalism (including terrorism), 
intolerance and anti-diversity which have not 
only contradicted the spirit of the Pancasila 
and the 1945 Constitution but also endangered 
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia 
(NKRI).
The HTI’s ideology also has ideological 
weaknesses as stated by Muhammad Sofi 
Mubarok. He revealed a number of weaknesses 
in the ideology of the movement which carried 
caliphate as part of religious dogma. Sofi 
argued that the interpretation of sharia texts 
related to the state law must be based on three 
main paradigms.16 First, the text of the sharia 
corpus as a source of law (al-nasyi’) which gave 
birth to various aspects of life to answer various 
legal problems, including constitutional law 
16 For more information, see the conclusion of the 
study by Mohammed Sofi Mubarok in his book, Kontroversi 
Dalil-dalil Khilafah (Jakarta: Pustaka Harakatuna, 2017).
(al-ahkam al-dawliyyah). The constitutional law 
found in legal sources is normative, abstract 
as well as general in nature, so the application 
requires contextual interpretation according to 
socio-cultural changes in society and a shift in 
its purpose. Second, constitutional issues must 
be subject to the muamalah legal category which 
must be seen as a wasail context, namely that 
constitutional law is an instrument (wasilah) to 
realize religious and humanitarian interests. 
Verses and hadiths of leadership, jihad, baiat, 
and criminal law (jinayah) must be placed in 
their context as a means, not a goal in itself. 
Based on the rules agreed upon by Islamic 
jurists, the constitutional construct follows 
the rules of al-aslu fil-mu’amalat al-iltifat ila al-
ma’ani duna al-ta’abbud (the basis of muamalah 
law should consider its substance and not a 
mere format). For this reason, classical Islamic 
jurists such as al-Shafi’i (150–204 AH) or 
Ibn Khaldun for example, did not question 
the royal system because basically religion 
does not denounce any government system, 
including the kingdom. Third, the main rules in 
constitutional law aim to create the benefit of 
humanity. That means, what is standard in the 
system of government is the goals of the state 
itself which Muslim intellectuals such as al-
Mawardi (died in 450 H), al-Ghazali (450 - 505 
AH) and Ibn Taymiyyah (661 - 728 AH) divided 
into in two aspects, namely creating benefit and 
preventing destruction, both in religious and 
worldly contexts. The format of constitutional 
law returns to the definition of politics (siyasah) 
itself as an activity that leads to benefit and 
counteracts the destruction of humanity even 
though it is not mentioned directly in the 
revelation or prophetic texts.17
17 This definition was put forward by Ibn ‘Aqil al-
Hanbali sebagai berikut: هعم  نوكي  لاعف  ناك  ام  يه  ةسايسلا 
لزن لاو لوسرلا هعضي مل نإو داسفلا نع دعبأو حلاصلا ىلإ برقأ سانلا 
.ينآرق صن وأ يحو هب See: Ibnu Hazm, al-Thuruq al-Hukmīyah 
fi al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah (Beirut: Darul Jil, First Edition, 
1418 H/1998 M), 17. See also: Abdul Karim Al-’Ānī, al-
Fatmawati, Kalsum Minangsih, Siti Mahmudah Noorhayati
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The very dynamic construct of constitutional 
law indicates that since its inception, HTI did 
not have a scientific tendency and put more 
emphasis on political motives in carrying out 
its mission. Interpretation of the corpus texts 
that are in line with the mission of muamalah 
laws which is very dynamic causes the text 
that is actually open for interpretations to be 
interpreted and applied in various formats in 
accordance with the shift in value and purpose 
which makes it very rigid. In various seminars 
over the span of several months before the 
issuance of Perppu Number 2 of 2017 until it 
was enacted, HTI activists insisted on their 
stand around the format of caliphate as the 
only standard system recognized by Islam. 
They also continued to view the government as 
ignoring the fundamental rights in the nation’s 
life by ignoring the freedom of opinion and 
expression. Moreover, Muslims throughout 
the world experience oppression, castration 
of rights and therefore caliphate is the only 
solution necessary to get out of adversity.18 
Based on the anthropological approach of Ja’far 
Subhani, HTI activists did not want to grasp 
Islamic political theories holistically. Various 
studies have shown that the doctrinal concepts 
offered by HT contradict each other, including 
in the succession of leadership that states that 
which clans are most entitled to serve as caliphs 
and other aspects concerning diplomatic 
relations with countries that they claim to be 
infidel states.
Other inconsistencies of HTI are the 
Dhawabith al-Ushuliyyah lil-Ijtihad fi al-Siyasah al-Syar’iyyah 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1434 H/2013 M), 74.
18 Discussion with Mohammed Sofi Mubarok, author 
of the book “Kontroversi Dali-dalil Khilafah” which on several 
occasions was presented as a comparative speaker along 
with several HTI figures, namely the National Seminar at 
Airlangga University on September 29, 2017, Cirebon GP 
Ansor Branch Executive Board Public Discussion entitled 
“HTI’s Movement following the Perppu “on 6 October 
2017, and National Halaqah” Students in the Middle of 
Radicalism and the Challenge of Transnational Ideology 
“at the University of North Sumatra - Medan on 26 October 
2017.
contradictions between theory and practice. 
While in the initial context of its appearance, 
An-Nabhani as the founder of Hizbut Tahrir 
had been involved in political discourse in 
Palestine by running for a judge (qadli) in the 
Sharia Court of al-Quds in Palestine in 1948 and 
a member of parliament (majlis niyabi) in 1950, 
it indicates that An-Nabhani himself does not 
consider the system outside the Caliphate to 
be un-Islamic. HTI took legal action by filing 
a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court which is 
actually a product of democracy that they forbid 
after the enactment of the Perppu. Referring 
to the Constitutional Court website, there are 
at least six decisions, namely Constitutional 
Court Decision Number 38/PUU-XV/2017 of 
2017, Constitutional Court Decision Number 
39/PUU-XV/2017 of 2017, Constitutional Court 
Decision Number 41/PUU-XV/2017 of 2017 
, Constitutional Court Decision Number 48/
PUU-XV/2017 of 2017, Constitutional Court 
Decision Number 52/PUU-XV/2017 of 2017, 
and Constitutional Court Decision Number 
58/PUU-XV/2017 which contains a lawsuit 
against Perppu Number 2 of 2017 concerning 
Community Organizations.19  One of them was 
directly submitted by the HTI coordinators, 
namely Ismail Yusanto, through his lawyer, 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra. However, based on the 
Constitutional Court Decision Number 39/
PUU-XV/2017 of 2017, the lawsuit was declared 
unacceptable.
After the issuance of the Perppu, Mahfudh 
MD stated that HTI had never revoked its 
statement about the importance of replacing 
the existing system with the caliphate, both 
concerning Pancasila as a single principle 
and democracy as an existing system of 
government.20 It means that in the legal context, 
HTI is against the existing Perppu and it clearly 
has a goal of changing the state philosophy and 
19 https://mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Putusan&id=
17&kat=1&cari=&menu=5.
20 Rosi’s Program (Kompas TV), 29 September 2017.
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spreads hatred in the community toward the 
legitimate government.
Therefore, the issuence of the Perppu in this 
context, has somehow minimized the threat that 
HTI militant cadres pose against the existence 
of the NKRI on the one hand, and maintain 
public order on the other. Based on information 
obtained from Nuruzzaman, one of the PP Ansor 
cadres who was heavily involved in research on 
radicalism and HTI mass organizations, several 
directors of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) 
have been influenced by HTI ideology so that 
the country is in a crisis situation because they 
can mobilize the masses to stage a coup by 
using policies and the state budget through 
BUMN.21 In fact, in the case of various countries 
for example, the Hizbut Tahrir movement has 
been declared illigal because dogmatically the 
caliphate claims are dangerous.22
Phrases that appear in Perppu Number 
2 Year 2017 are, for example, “Circumstances 
of compelling crisis”, thus, have fulfilled the 
conditions for dissolving HTI and are relevant 
to the provisions of the hadith lâdharara wa-
lâdhirara (not permitted to do something 
dangerous). The hadith was discussed further 
by Muslim intellectual of the Hanbali school, 
Najmuddin at-Thufi in his treatise23 which was 
then expanded to include matters that caused 
damage to the primary principles of religion 
(al-kulliyyât al-khams), including religion (dîn), 
soul (nafs), reason (‘aql), lineage (nasl), and 
wealth (mâl ). HTI’s viewpoint is directly related 
to sensitive issues in the context of nation and 
state, so it is prone to cause social conflict in the 
grassroots. Ibn ‘Âsyûr argued that social unity 
(ijtim’al-ummah) as a benefit at any time can 
21 Seminar on Nationality at the Faculty of Social and 
Political Sciences, Airlangga University on September 29, 
2017,
22 Fatwa No. 34834 and 13372 issued by the Ministry 
of Waqf and Islamic Affairs, Qatar.
23 For more detail, see: Najmuddin al-Thufi, Risalah 
fi Ri’ayat al-Mashlahah (Cairo: Dar al-Mishriyyah al-
Lubnaniyyah, 1413 AH/1993 AD).
take precedence even though in the hierarchy 
of benefit, maintaining religion is at the top of 
the hierarchy that must take precedence over 
seeking other benefits.24
C. Conclusion
It requires a conceptual understanding 
that this da’wah movement is a resistance 
that cannot be denied against State hegemony 
so that academic anxiety will also raise the 
resistance of Hizbut Tahrir which has variants, 
strategies, influencing factors and counter 
narratives revealed through Law No. 16 of 2017 
concerning Community organizations to reveal 
HTI’s inconsistencies.
In conclusion, the HTI movement as a da’wah 
and political organization will continue to exist 
even though this organization has institutionally 
been banned. Based on observations made 
and discussion held with several community 
leaders, HTI appears to continue its activities 
in recruiting new members, especially in public 
campuses which have become the HTI base, 
even though it is carried silently. In addition, 
national political contestation ahead of the 2019 
Presidential Election is also very vulnerable to 
being exploited by HTI, either by continuing 
to spread its propaganda or raising issues of 
government failure in eradicating poverty, 
securing domestic assets, and upholding the 
rule of law.
This study has obstacles in achieving 
significant results because the the issues covered 
should more specific and genuine. Therefore, 
literary data is still very much required, 
especially about the resistance movement. 
In addition, the access to mobile information 
centers, both electronic and printed media 
could not be made since the Hizbut Tahrir page 
has been blocked and could not be accessed by 
the public.
24 Ibnu ‘Ashur, Tafsir al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir, vol. 16 
(1997), 291.
Fatmawati, Kalsum Minangsih, Siti Mahmudah Noorhayati
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